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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982 the International Whaling Commission (IWC or Com-
mission) passed a moratorium on all commercial whaling which runs
from 1986 until at least 1990.1 However, while the moratorium is
part of the substantive international law of whaling, the Commission
is essentially powerless to enforce it.2
On the night of November 9, 1986, a private international con-
servation group took the enforcement of the moratorium into their
own hands. 3 A two-man team from the Sea Shepherd Conservation
Society (Sea Shepherd) opened the bottom valves on two Icelandic
whaling boats (the Hvalur 6 & 7) sending them to the bottom of Rey-
kjavik harbor.4 Sea Shepherd justified its actions on the grounds that
the Icelandic whaling fleet was violating the International Whaling
Commission's moratorium on commercial whaling.- Icelandic offi-
cials, however, claimed that the fleet was not violating the morato-
rium, but rather was operating legitimately under the authority of the
Whaling Convention and condemned Sea Shepherd's actions as acts
of "terrorists."
6
This incident and subsequent actions of the Commission expose
several of the basic weaknesses of the IWC and the problems it has in
enforcing international whaling law. If the moratorium on commer-
1. 34 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N, Chairman's Report, at app. 6, para. 2 (1982).
2. The scope of the IWC's management powers presently includes both large cetaceans
(sperm, sei, fin, blue, humpback, right, bowhead and pygmy right whales) and some small
cetaceans (minke, Bryde's and orca (killer) whales, and bottlenose dolphins). P. BIRNIE, IN-
TERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO CON-
SERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE-WATCHING 31 (1985). There is
controversy over the IWC's authority regarding other types of small cetaceans. Id. This Note
will look at the moratorium as it regards the cetaceans over which the Commission has unchal-
lenged management authority. Therefore, this article will not deal with any of the issues sur-
rounding the taking of pilot whales by the Danish Faroe Islands.
3. SEA SHEPHERD LOG, Feb. 1987, at 1. See also Stewart, Militants Damage Iceland
Whale Processing Plants; Official Calls it Terrorism, L.A. Times, Nov. 11, 1986, at 18, col. 1.
4. SEA SHEPHERD LOG, Feb. 1987, at 1. See also Stewart, supra note 3, at 18, col. 1.
5. Stewart, supra note 3, at 18, col. 1.
6. Id.
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cial whaling is to achieve its purpose of replenishing depleted whale
stocks, then either the IWC's authority will have to be strengthened
or alternative methods of enforcement will have to be adopted.
However, it is not merely the power to enforce the moratorium
which is in question. The weaknesses in the IWC are general rather
than particular to the moratorium. The weaknesses are in the funda-
mental construction of the IWC.
This Note will identify and examine some of the weaknesses of
the IWC in light of the moratorium and the surrounding conflict. It
will begin with an examination of the origins and structure of the
IWC in general and of the moratorium in particular. Next, it will
look at three provisions in the IWC's charter 7 which, when taken to-
gether, disable the Commission: the objections clause (article V, para.
3), the scientific permit provision (article VIII, para. 1) and the en-
forcement provision (article IX). This Note will then look at the posi-
tive and negative aspects of various alternative methods of
enforcement, and finally will examine the possible solution of revising
the IWC's charter to eliminate at least some of the inherent
weaknesses.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
AND THE MORATORIUM
The International Whaling Commission was established in 1946
by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 8 (Con-
vention or Whaling Convention) and was the first global organization
of its kind.9 The major whaling nations which originally formed the
Commission'0 were concerned with the effect declining whale stocks
would have on the economic viability of the whaling industry. ' I This
concern was set out in the Convention's preamble, where the parties
officially recognized their common interest in achieving "the optimum
level of whale stocks as rapidly as possible without causing wide-
7. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S.
74. (hereinafter Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention).
8. Id.
9. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 168 (1985).
10. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 74 n.l.
11. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 2. Birnie also points out that in 1967:
the United Kingdom abandoned whaling because the International Whaling Com-
mission (IWC) ... had failed to arrest the decline in commercially exploited stocks,
so that whaling ceased to be an economic activity for many of the states that had
traditionally engaged in it.
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spread economic and nutritional distress."' 2 In order to achieve this
objective, the convention recognized the need to confine whaling oper-
ations "to those species best able to sustain exploitation in order to
give an interval for recovery to certain species of whales now depleted
in numbers."1 3 As a result, the Commission's stated purpose is to
ensure the "proper and effective conservation and development of
whale stocks .... ,114 As of 1987, approximately forty states are mem-
bers of the IWC.' 5
The Convention (including the annexed Schedule of Rules)
which created the substantive law of whaling, is a multilateral treaty
which has been either ratified or adhered to by each member or "con-
tracting" government.1 6 The articles in the Convention operate as a
framework for the international whaling community. However, most
of the day-to-day whaling operations are governed by the annexed
schedule of rules (the Schedule).' 7 These rules and regulations are
highly specific, defining acceptable and unacceptable practices, and
establishing catch returns (quotas), zones and seasons.1 8 In as much
as the Schedule is part of the Convention,19 it is binding on all con-
tracting governments. 20 Amendments to the Schedule, which may be
made at the Commission's annual meetings,21 are also binding on any
contracting government which does not lodge a formal objection.22
In 1982, on the basis of recommendations from the Scientific
Committee (SC), 23 the IWC passed an amendment to the schedule
12. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 74.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 74-76.
15. The members of the IWC are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Belize,
Brazil, Chile, People's Republic of China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Mauritius,
Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Peru, Phillipines, Saint Lu-
cia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, The Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Af-
rica, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. In
addition to member states, meetings are attended by observers from non-member states, inter-
national governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations. 37
REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 5-7 (1987).
16. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 74 n. 1.
17. Id. at 78-82. This schedule has been amended many times since the original schedule
entered into force.
18. Id. at 80.
19. Id. at 76, art. I, para. 1.
20. Id. at 86, art. X, para. 4.
21. Id. at 80, art. V, para. 1.
22. Id. at 80, art. V, para. 3.
23. The Scientific Committee is a branch of the IWC which "shall be composed of scien-
tists nominated by the Commissioner of each nation which elects, at the Annual Meeting of
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implementing the following moratorium on commercial whaling in an
effort to replenish depleted whale stocks:
[c]atch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales
from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic sea-
sons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept under
review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the
latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment
of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modifi-
cation of this provision and the establishment of other catch
limits. 2 4
This amendment, by temporarily removing humans as a major
predator, will allow depleted whale populations to grow. In turn, this
will increase the chances of achieving the "optimum level" of whale
stocks referred to in the Convention's Preamble.
25
The moratorium has generally been interpreted by the press as a
four year ban.26 However, while the moratorium will remain in effect
for at least four years (1986 through 1990, when the first comprehen-
sive assessment will be made), nothing in its language assures that the
ban will be lifted in 1990. The moratorium guarantees only that in
1990 the size and strength of whale stocks will be assessed, and that
the Commission, to be represented on that Committee." Rules of Procedure of the Scientific
Committee § A, para. 1 (1983) (hereinafter SC Rules), cited in P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 735.
These are the only voting members. Id.
There are also additional non-voting participants and observers. Intergovernmental orga-
nizations (e.g. UNEP or FAO) may have adviser status, SC Rules, paras. 2-3, while non-
member governments and international non-governmental organizations (e.g. Greenpeace or
the RSPCA) may send observers. Id. at paras. 4-5. Finally, Commissioners may nominate
qualified scientists to present and discuss documents and research papers. Id. at para. 6.
24. 33 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 40 (1983) (emphasis added). "Pelagic" refers to
open-ocean whaling.
25. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 74. The interpretation of the
term "optimum level" has changed over the years. Until the late 60's/early 70's
MSY [Maximum Sustainable Yield], equated with the principle of maintaining popu-
lations at the size which theoretically would yield the largest harvest indefinitely-at
a level known as the "maximum sustainable yield" stock level-was, however, relied
on, and even incorporated into many fishery agreements because it was thought to be
a simple objective standard permanently protecting stocks from over-fishing and con-
sequent depletion . . .As stocks declined and ecological considerations impinged
more importantly on conservation of stocks, even MSY has been subjected to severe
scientific criticism and other concepts, taking account of more ecological factors,
have been pressed as a more appropriate interpretation of [optimum level]. The issue
is still fraught with great scientific controversy.
P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 170.
26. See, e.g., Stumbo, Modern-Day Pirates Fight the Whalers, L.A. Times, June 13, 1986,
at II, col. 1; Protesters Sink 2 Iceland Whaling Boats, L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at 17, col. 4;
Stewart, supra note 3, at 18, col. 1; Schoenberger, Japan Tries New Tactics to Keep Whaling
Industry, L.A. Times, Feb. 22, 1988, at I1, col. 5.
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the Commission will consider lifting the ban.27 The absence of a spe-
cific end date suggests that if whale populations have failed to make a
sufficient recovery by 1990 the moratorium could remain in effect
indefinitely.
28
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE MORATORIUM BY THE IWC
The fact that a majority of the members of the IWC voted in
favor of the moratorium 29 means little in determining its potential for
success. The votes were divided along a definite line: non-whaling
states voted for the moratorium, whaling states voted against it, with
the exception of Spain, which voted for the moratorium.30 Since the
whaling states have expressed their aversion to the amendment
through their votes, the ability of the IWC to enforce compliance with
the moratorium is critical. Without effective enforcement, the mora-
torium is nothing more than an agreement between states to discon-
tinue an activity they were not engaged in in the first place.
There are three provisions in the Convention which, taken to-
gether, effectively render the IWC impotent to enforce its own regula-
tions. These provisions are the objections clause,3' the scientific
permits provision, 32 and the enforcement provision. 33
A. The Objections Clause
The objections clause is found in article V, paragraph 3 of the
Convention 34 and the process can be summarized as follows:
27. See supra text accompanying note 24.
28. Effects of violations of such an open-ended moratorium on whaling states are greater
than they would be with a fixed term. Here the possible effects of the violation, instead of
merely decreasing the new catch limits at the end of four years, may result in the continuation
of the zero catch limit beyond the initial period with a resulting loss in profits to whaling fleets
adhering to the moratorium.
29. Twenty-five members voted for the moratorium, seven voted against and five ab-
stained. 33 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 21 (1983).
30. Voting in favor of the moratorium were: Antigua, Argentina, Australia, Belize,
Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, France, FRG, India, Kenya, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, UK, USA
and Uruguay. Voting against were: Brazil, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Peru and
USSR. Five countries abstained: Chile, People's Republic of China, Phillipines, South Africa
and Switzerland. 33 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 21 (1983). See infra Appendix A for coun-
tries which registered non-aboriginal whale catches between 1981 and 1986.
31. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 80, art. V, para. 3.
32. Id. at 82, art. VIII, para. 1.
33. Id. at 84, art. IX.
34. Id. at 80-82.
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Amendments. . . do not become effective:
(i) until 90 days after their notification by the Commission to
Contracting Governments;
(ii) if any Government delivers an objection before the end of this
period, such objection delays the entry into force for all gov-
ernments for a further 90 days;
(iii) during this second 90 day period any Government can still
object;
(iv) if any objection is received during this second 90 day period
any Government can object within a period of 30 days from
the date upon which the last objection of the second 90 day
period was received, whichever of (iii) or (iv) is the later;
(v) at the end of this period (which could be as long as 210 days,
i.e. seven months) the amendment comes into force only for
the Governments that have not objected.
35
The ultimate effect of this clause is that a member state may escape
being bound by any new regulation which it does not like by lodging a
formal objection within the requisite time (three to seven months
from notification). 36 From that time on, the objecting state is exempt
from the new rule until it chooses to revoke its objection. 37 It has
been argued that objections clauses in fisheries agreements are neces-
sary to protect state sovereignty38 and to prevent states from with-
drawing from a Convention as a whole. 39 The end result is often that
the states, whose abusive practices are targeted by an amendment,
may escape being bound by that amendment.
In the case at hand, four of the seven whaling states which voted
against the moratorium (Japan, USSR, Norway and Peru) filed timely
objections and are now legally exempt from the ban on commercial
whaling.4° Because these countries have invoked their power to ob-
ject, they can never be in violation of the moratorium regardless of
their whaling practices.
41
35. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 194.
36. Id.
37. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 82.
38. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 194.
39. Id. It is not always the case that countries file objections to amendments which they
feel to be against their interests. In the present case only four of the seven states which voted
against the moratorium lodged formal objections (Japan, Norway, Peru and the USSR). Id. at
614. The remaining three (Brazil, Iceland, and S. Korea) did not. Id. at 615. However, it is
possible that they would have lodged an objection if the IWC had the power to enforce its
rules.
40. 33 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 40 (1983).
41. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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B. The Scientific Permits Provision
Two of the remaining four whaling countries which neither voted
for the moratorium nor filed timely objections (Iceland and South Ko-
rea) 42 have issued permits to their whaling fleets which allow them to
continue their whaling operations for the stated purpose of "scientific
research. '43 While the use of the objections procedure is legal,44
much of the controversy surrounding the moratorium is over the le-
gality of the Icelandic and South Korean scientific permits. The con-
tention is that these permits have been issued primarily as a means of
continuing commercial whaling during the moratorium and that any
scientific value is secondary and insufficient to satisfy the applicable
criteria for issuance.
These permits, when issued for legitimate research, 45 serve the
vital purpose of helping the Commission determine the size and via-
bility of whale stocks and setting future catch limits. 46 However, if
misused the permits can thwart the goals of IWC regulations.
1. Purpose of and Criteria for Scientific Permits
The IWC, through the Scientific Committee (SC), relies on re-
search carried on by independent research groups in order to effec-
tively regulate whaling. 47 Article V, paragraph 2(b) requires that
amendments to the schedule "shall be based on scientific findings. ' 48
The Scientific Committee is the branch of the IWC which is responsi-
ble for gathering the data that the Commission uses in making its
determinations. 49 However, the SC does not conduct its own re-
search.50 Rather, its role with regard to data collection is to "review
the current scientific and statistical information with respect to whales
42. See infra Appendix A.
43. 38 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N, Chairman's Rep., at 39-40 (1987).
44. This objection procedure is specifically provided for in Article V, para. 3 of the Con-
vention. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 74.
45. See, e.g., Australia. Progress Report on Cetacean Research, June 1985 to May 1986,
37 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 159-66 (1987); United States. Progress Report on Cetacean
Research, June, 1985 to May, 1986, 37 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 183-90 (1987).
46. Most of the IWC annual repoit consists of research reports by various member states.
Reports by member countries and papers by non-member organizations are presented at the
meetings of the Scientific Committee and provide much of the data supporting the recommen-
dations of the Scientific Committee.
47. IWC Rules of Procedure, § J(3), reprinted in P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 729, and SC
Rules, supra note 23, at 735.
48. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 80.
49. See supra note 23.
50. Id.
1989]
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and whaling . . . review current scientific research programmes of
Governments, other international organisations or of private or-
ganisations ... and [to] submit reports and recommendations to the
Commission."51 Much of the data available to the SC each year
comes from the cetacean research done by member countries.
Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Convention provides inter alia
that:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this convention, any Con-
tracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special
permit authorizing that national to kill, take, and treat whales for
purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to the
number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting
Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking and treating of
whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be ex-
empt from the operation of this Convention."
'52
With the exception that there be a "scientific purpose," article
VIII, paragraph 1 does not provide much in the way of criteria to be
considered when issuing permits.53 However, the Commission passed
a resolution in 1986 which recommended certain supplemental
criteria.
54
The Commission's 1986 resolution recommended that both the
contracting government, prior to issuing a permit, and the SC in re-
viewing the research results of prior permits should consider whether:
(1) the objectives of the research are not practically and scientifi-
cally feasible through non-lethal research techniques;
(2) the proposed research is intended, and structured accordingly
to contribute information essential for rational management of
the stock;
(3) the number, age and sex of whales to be taken are necessary to
complete the research and will facilitate the conduct of the
comprehensive assessment;
(4) whales will be killed in a manner consistent with the provisions
of Section III of the Schedule, due regard being had to whether
there are compelling scientific reasons to the contrary.
55
The Commission further recommended that the contracting govern-
ments should take great care not to "further deplete" or "substan-
51. IWC Rules of Procedure, § J(3), supra note 47, at 729.
52. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 82 (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. 37 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 25 (1987).
55. Id.
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tially impede" the recovery of Protection Stock 56 and submit
proposals for permits to the Scientific Committee for review.
57
2. The Icelandic and South Korean Scientific Permits
After the moratorium went into effect, both Iceland and South
Korea issued scientific permits to their commercial fleets. 58 The Ice-
landic permit allowed the Hvalur Whaling Company to catch 200
whales per year during the moratorium.5 9 The attacks on the Hvalur
6 and 7 were based on Sea Shepherd's contention that the Icelanders
were "[p]rostituting science to protect their commercial whaling in-
terests." 6 This statement, in essence if not in tone, accords with the
Commission's findings that the permits were not issued for valid re-
search purposes.
Using much milder language, the IWC, at its annual meeting in
June of 1987, also came to the conclusion that both Iceland and South
Korea were in violation of the Scientific Permit clause.6' This deci-
sion was based on the criteria enunciated in the 1986 resolution.
While the 1986 resolution is not technically binding on any mem-
ber country, there are two factors that suggest that Iceland (and, to a
lesser degree, South Korea) should be held accountable for these cri-
teria. First, Iceland participated in the working group which devel-
oped and presented the resolution. 62 Second, the Commission (which
included both Iceland and South Korea) adopted the resolution by
consensus.63 Given this indication of support, it seems unlikely that
either Iceland or South Korea could successfully argue that their sci-
entific permits for the 1986-87 seasons were not subject to the new
criteria.
Upon concluding that the Icelandic and South Korean permits
did not satisfy the requirements of the 1986 resolution, the Commis-
sion passed a new series of resolutions requiring stricter review of pro-
posed scientific permits 64 and recommending that Iceland and South
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 43.
59. L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1986, at 17, col. 4.
60. Stewart, supra note 3, at I8, col. 1.
61. 38 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N, Chairman's Rep., at 39-40 (1987).
62. 37 REP INT'L WHAL. COMM'N, at 12 (1987).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 37-38. The resolutions clause which established four new criteria passed
nineteen to six with seven abstentions. The clause establishing a commission review passed
seventeen to seven with eight abstentions. Id. at 4-d (1987). WHALE NEWS is a publication of
1989]
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Korea revoke the permits presently held by their whaling fleets.65
The permit review resolution, which was proposed by the United
States, has two distinct provisions. The first creates four new criteria
for the scientific committee to use in determining the link between the
scientific basis and methodology of a permit, on the one hand, and the
stated aims of the comprehensive assessment, on the other. 66 The sec-
ond provision calls for a full Commission review of the Scientific
Committee's findings. 67 Under this resolution, the Commission Secre-
tary can request that an issuing government either refuse to issue a
new permit or revoke the existing permit whenever the four criteria
are not satisfied.
68
However, Commission resolutions and recommendations are not
part of the Convention or Schedule, and are not binding on the par-
ties.69 Furthermore, even if recommendations or resolutions were
binding on governments, the Commission lacks the power to enforce
them.
C. The Enforcement Provision
The IWC has resolved that neither the Icelandic nor the South
Korean scientific permits are truly for "scientific purposes" within the
meaning of article VIII of the Whaling Convention. Therefore, Ice-
land and South Korea cannot rely on article VIII to exempt their
the American Cetacean Society (ACS). 34 WHALE NEWS, Summer 1987, at 4-a. ACS has the
status of International Non-Governmental Organization Observer. The 1987 IWC meeting
was attended by a representative of ACS. 37 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 7 (1987).
65. 38 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N, Chairman's Rep., at 39-40 (1987). The resolution
approving the revocation of the Icelandic scientific permit passed nineteen to four with eight
abstentions. The resolution approving the revocation of the South Korean permit passed
nineteen to three with nine abstentions. 34 WHALE NEWS, Summer 1987, at 4-d.
66. 34 WHALE NEWS, Summer 1987, at 4-b. The new criteria are:
(1) The research addresses a question or questions that should be answered in order
to conduct the comprehensive assessment or to meet other critically important
research needs;
(2) The research can be conducted without adversely affecting the overall status and
trends of the stock in question or the success of the comprehensive assessment of
such stock;
(3) The research addresses a question or questions that cannot be answered by analy-
sis of existing data and/or use of non-lethal research techniques; and
(4) The research is likely to yield results leading to reliable answers to the question
or questions being addressed.
38 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N, Chairman's Rep., at 37 (1987).
67. 34 WHALE NEWS, Summer 1987, at 4-b.
68. Id.
69. Only the Convention and amended Schedule are binding. Int'l Whaling Regulation
Convention, supra note 7, at 76, art. I.
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whaling operations from the moratorium. 70 However, even though
the Commission has found that Iceland and South Korea are in viola-
tion of the Convention, it lacks the authority either to put an end to
the illegal practices or to punish the offenders.
7'
Lack of enforcement power is the International Whaling Com-
mission's single greatest weakness. If this weakness cannot be cured,
then alternative methods of enforcement need to be found if there is to
be any meaningful regulation of the whaling trade.
According to article IX of the Convention, which deals with the
punishment of infractions, the power to punish nationals belongs
strictly to the Contracting Government possessing jurisdiction.72 For
example, only the Icelandic government would have jurisdiction to
prosecute violations by the Hvalur Company. Furthermore, the Con-
vention does not provide for punishment where the violator is not a
national, but a Contracting Government. 73 Therefore, the Conven-
tion does not give the Commission any power to enforce its rules and
regulations.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO ENFORCEMENT BY THE IWC AS
PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED
As the Convention is presently written the IWC is powerless to
enforce the moratorium. There are three possible ways for the mora-
torium to be enforced. Two of these ways presently exist, but have
serious flaws. The first is bringing suit before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ or World Court), and the second is continuing extrale-
gal enforcement by the Sea Shepherd Society. A third possibility
which is not in effect, but which is most promising, is the revision of
the Convention itself.
A. Legal Enforcement through the International Court of Justice
The IWC cannot take direct action against either Iceland or
70. Id.
71. Id. at 84, art. IX. In pertinent part, article IX provides:
1. Each Contracting Government shall take appropriate measures to ensure the
application of the provisions of this Convention and the punishment of infractions
against the said provisions in operations carried out by persons or by vessels under its
jurisdiction . ..
3. Prosecution for infractions against or contraventions of this Convention shall
be instituted by the Government having jurisdiction over the offense.
Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
1989]
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South Korea. However, if these countries refuse to revoke their per-
mits, there may still be a legal remedy.
When the U.S. resolution was proposed at the 1987 IWC meet-
ing, Mr. H. Asgrimsson, the Icelandic Commissioner, 74 threatened to
take the issue to the International Court of Justice in the event the
resolution passed.75 The implication of Asgrimsson's threat is that he
has bound himself on the record to accept as final the decision of the
court-even if that decision is unfavorable. The members of the IWC
abiding by the moratorium should call Asgrimsson's bluff (if it is a
bluff) and bring their own suit against Iceland for violation of the
Whaling Convention.
The initial question is whether the ICJ would have jurisdiction
over a case between Iceland or South Korea and another member of
the IWC. However, even if the court would have jurisdiction over
such a case (and despite Mr. Asgrimsson's statements at the 1987
meeting), the circumstances surrounding the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion case76 suggest that Iceland would not accept the court's jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, Iceland might not consider itself bound by any
judgment. Finally, there are potential problems with the enforcement
of an ICJ judgment.
1. The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
While the ICJ's jurisdiction is severely limited, 77 it does have the
jurisdiction to hear a case between Iceland and any contracting gov-
ernment of the IWC which is a member of the United Nations. The
relevant jurisdictional provisions of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice provide the court with jurisdiction over any case
brought by one country against another country.78 This automati-
cally extends to all countries which are members of the United Na-
tions. 79 Parties can declare that they recognize the jurisdiction of the
court as compulsory in one of two ways: either completely or with
reservations. 80 Most of the European community has acceded with-
out exception to the compulsory jurisdiction of the court.8 ' Iceland,
74. 37 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 6 (1987).
75. 34 WHALE NEWS, Summer 1987, at 4-b.
76. ICJ Reports (1974).
77. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 35.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 36, para. 2.
81. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B., at 56-89 (1983).
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however, has never formally filed a declaration of any sort.8 2 Focus-
ing on Iceland's violation of the scientific permit provision for pur-
poses of illustration, the court, therefore, would have jurisdiction over
the parties in a case between Iceland and any of the other contracting
governments.8
3
Where the court has jurisdiction over the parties, it may hear
cases relating to: "(a) the interpretation of treaties; (b) questions of
international law; (c) existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of international obligation; and (d) the nature or
extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation. ''8 4 The case against Iceland would involve: (1) the inter-
pretation of Article VIII of the Whaling Convention (a multilateral
treaty), (2) whether Iceland's issuance of a scientific permit was in
violation of Article VIII; and (3) if so, what damages (if any) flow
from the violation. Therefore, the court would have jurisdiction over
the case as well as the parties.
Assuming that the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear a suit against Ice-
land and that a decision is rendered against Iceland, the question re-
mains whether that decision would be any more effective than the
resolution passed by the IWC. Legally, Iceland is not bound by the
U.S. resolution or the recommendations of the IWC.8 5 Therefore, the
conflict between the IWC and Iceland will technically remain only a
difference of interpretation until a decision is rendered by a court
whose jurisdiction Iceland recognizes. However, according to the
Statute of the ICJ, an interpretation by the ICJ of Article VIII would
be legally binding on all the parties8 6 as a final determination of the
issue.87
2. The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
In 1961, the United Kingdom and Iceland signed a compromise
agreement attempting to resolve a ten year dispute over fishing lim-
itS.88 In the agreement, the United Kingdom agreed to recognize a
82. Id.
83. The members of the IWC are also members of the U.N. Id. at 37-41. See supra note
15 for a list of the present members of the IWC.
84. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 2.
85. See supra note 69.
86. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59.
87. Id. art. 60.
88. Reese, The Making of a Casefor the International Court of Justice-Icelandic Fishing
Rights, 6 COMp. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 394, 399 (1973).
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twelve-mile limit for Icelandic territorial waters. 89 Ten years later, in
1971, the Icelandic government unilaterally extended their fishing
limit from twelve to fifty miles.90 The United Kingdom responded in
1972 by bringing an action against Iceland before the ICJ.91 How-
ever, Iceland refused to comply with the ICJ interim order on the
basis that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction over the matter.92
For Iceland, the refusal was justified because "the matter in-
volved was one of national economic survival." 93 However, the court
did not accept this reasoning and held that there was jurisdiction. 94
Iceland would likely view a case involving the whaling morato-
rium in the same light as the Fisheries Jurisdiction case. Iceland's
economy is primarily dependent on the fishing industry.95 Like
whales, the Icelandic cod, which was the subject of the 1972 dispute,
was an overfished species facing extinction. 96 In order to maintain
their catch the Icelandic fleets needed a larger territory in which to
operate. 97 Iceland felt that economic necessity justified the extension
of the fishing limits in violation of its previous agreement.
In the case at hand, the only way for Iceland to maintain its
whale catches during the moratorium is to evade the regulation. It
follows that Iceland would also classify this action as necessary to
preserve the fishing industry. It would then be necessary to their na-
tional economic survival and, therefore, beyond the reach of the ICJ.
However, since this argument was rejected by the court in the Fisher-
ies Jurisdiction case, it seems most likely that it would be rejected if
raised again.
Even if the court overruled any objections to its jurisdiction and
ultimately issued a judgment against Iceland, the question of enforce-
ability of such judgment remains.
3. Enforcement of an ICJ Judgment
In reality, being bound by a World Court decision may mean
very little. The ICJ has no enforcement arm-no army exists which
89. Id.
90. Id. at 400.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 401.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 394-95.
96. Id. at 396.
97. Id.
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can go into a country and force compliance with an ICJ judgment.
However, Iceland is a small country which must deal economically
with the powerful European Economic Community (EEC). The
members of the EEC have accepted without reservation the jurisdic-
tion of the Court. 98 Furthermore, several of the EEC member states
are also members of the IWC99 and voted for the moratorium. l°° It
seems unlikely that Iceland can afford to lose its credibility with the
major economic powers of Western Europe. One serious drawback of
this alternative is that while a country such as Iceland might be forced
to comply for economic reasons, another country, in a different case,
might not feel so compelled.101
Another drawback of legal enforcement in this case is that a
judgment entered against Iceland might be too little, too late. The
amount of time consumed in reaching a decision and achieving com-
pliance, if in fact any compliance could be achieved, could be devas-
tating to existing whale stocks if illegal whaling continued unchecked
during that time.
B. Continued Extralegal Enforcement by the Sea Shepherd Society
This section deals with the possibility of continued extralegal en-
forcement by Sea Shepherd. It is appropriate to give some back-
ground into the history and makeup of this particular group.
The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, nicknamed the "Whale
Navy," was founded in 1977 by Canadian Paul Watson as a radical
offshoot of the environmental group Greenpeace. 0 2 In general, Sea
Shepherd's actions are aimed at preventing the slaughter of marine
mammals. The organization operates under the principle that life is
more important than property. 0 3 The members of Sea Shepherd fol-
low this principle in their actions as well as in theory. They hold that
"[o]ur respect for all life demands that we cannot harm one life even
98. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B., at 56-89 (1983).
99. Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Koers, The European
Economic Community and International Fisheries Organizations, 1 LEGAL Iss. EUR. INTEGRA-
TION 113, 127 (1984).
100. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 614.
101. See, e.g., Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 70 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27) (United
States failure to acknowledge the judgment of the ICJ).
102. Stewart, supra note 3, at 18, col. 1. Watson was ousted from Greenpeace in 1977 for
taking a club away from a hunter during the 1977 Newfoundland baby seal hunt and tossing it
into the sea. Stumbo, supra note 26, at Il, col. 1.
103. SEA SHEPHERD LOG, Feb. 1987, at 3.
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while protecting another."10 4 As a result, all campaigns are governed
by the following strict guidelines: 05 (1) Sea Shepherd teams may not
use either explosives or weapons; (2) no possibility of injury to anyone
is permitted; (3) the team may not resist arrest; and (4) both the team
and the Society must accept full responsibility for their actions and
any consequences. 0 6 Long before its scuttling of the Icelandic whal-
ing boats, the Sea Shepherd had made a reputation for itself in a series
of confrontations with "pirate whalers." In the years 1979 and 1980,
Sea Shepherd took credit for sinking five pirate whalers in the North
Atlantic and for forcing a sixth boat out of the whaling business.' 0 7
At least three of the boats that sunk, the Sierra, the Susan and the
Theresa had previously been identified to the IWC by the government
of the Seychelles as "whalers of convenience" (or pirate whalers). os
There is concern over the operation of "whalers of convenience"
because:
a) unlike most commercial whalers, they are totally indiscrimi-
nate; taking whales of any species without regard for size, sex or
scientific status; and
b) they do so wherever they please; violating Commission Areas
and Divisions, and national jurisdictions, at will. 09
Sea Shepherd claims that its campaign against the pirate whalers has
"wip[ed] out all illegal whaling in the North Atlantic by enforcing the
laws of the International Whaling Commission."' '0
Sea Shepherd has done much toward enforcing the IWC regula-
tions. However, it is unlikely that their tactics will ever be considered
legitimate. Much of the long term effectiveness of Sea Shepherd's
104. Id. at 1.
105. Id.
106. These guidelines also governed the attack on the Icelandic whalers. Id.
107. The Sierra, the Susan, the Theresa, the Isba I, and the Isba 1H. The Astrid has been
converted into a fishing vessel. SEA SHEPHERD LOG, Feb. 1987, at 3.
108. Whaling Under Flags of Convenience: The Government of Seychelles Urges the In-
ternational Whaling Commission to Consider Action Against a Growing Threat to the Com-
mission's New Management Procedure and the Rights and Reputation of its Member Nations,
reprinted in P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 846 (hereinafter Whaling Under Flags of Convenience).
See also (1979) Report by South African Commissioner on Steps Taken to Implement the 1977
Resolution Concerning the Transfer of Whaling Equipment, etc. to Non-Member Nations.
"Whalers of convenience" are defined as "vessels which belong neither to member nations [of
the IWC], nor to fleets of recognized non-member whaling nations. They operate under Flags
of Convenience and have no direct connection with their Ports of Registry or with any recog-
nized whaling nation." Whaling Under Flags of Convenience, at 840.
109. Whaling Under Flags of Convenience, supra note 108, at 840.
110. SEA SHEPHERD LOG, Feb. 1987, at 3.
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campaigns results from the destruction of property that makes it im-
possible for whalers to continue illegal operations.,,, While the Sea
Shepherd team which sank the Icelandic whaling boats was careful
that no harm would come to any people, their objective, according to
Watson, "was to cause as much economic damage to the whaling in-
dustry as they possibly could." 1 2 Since this is a tactic which is not
condoned by the majority of environmental activists," 3 it is doubtful
that it would be officially endorsed by even the most strident anti-
whaling members of the IWC. Furthermore, even though Sea Shep-
herd's choice of targets has thus far been consistent with IWC efforts
(for example, the Seychelles" 14 and South African reports on pirate
whalers" 15 and the IWC resolution regarding Icelandic and South Ko-
rean scientific permits' 16), the two organizations have philosophies
which are ultimately irreconcilable. The IWC is premised on the
preservation and development of the whaling industry and views con-
servation only in that light.' '7 Sea Shepherd, on the other hand, is
working toward a permanent end to all whaling."18 It seems only a
matter of time before Sea Shepherd takes action, such as the sinking
of the Icelandic whalers, against an operation either sanctioned or di-
rectly supported by the IWC. Therefore, while Sea Shepherd is pres-
ently helping to conserve whale stocks, it can never really take the
place of direct IWC enforcement of its own regulations.
C. Revision of the Convention
In the absence of enforcement by the International Whaling
Commission, legal actions before the ICJ as well as the extralegal
campaigns of Sea Shepherd Society, provide for at least limited en-
forcement of IWC regulations. However, these alternatives are far
from complete and each has serious drawbacks.' 19 What is needed
are changes in the Whaling Convention itself which gives the IWC the
ability to enforce its own rules. Two changes in particular are neces-
sary to improve the effectiveness of the IWC: the insertion of an
111. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. See also text accompanying supra note 4.
112. Stewart, supra note 3, at 18, col. 1.
113. See supra note 102.
114. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 108.
116. 38 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N, Chairman's Rep., at 39-40 (1987).
117. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 74.
118. SEA SHEPHERD LoG, Feb. 1987, at 2.
119. See supra notes 101, 118 and accompanying text.
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"arrest or seize" clause, 120 and the removal of the objections loop-
hole. 121 However, to be effective, both changes must be made. Either
revision alone would do little to strengthen the Commission.
1. Strengthening the IWC's Enforcement Power through an
"Arrest or Seize" Clause
Whaling law will never be adequately enforced until there is an
enforcement body which responds directly to the determinations of
the IWC. With respect to enforcement power, the weaknesses in the
Whaling Convention are shared by most other fisheries agreements. 122
At present, no international fishery body has the power to enforce
compliance on its own. 123 However, most of the "Pacific Ocean Con-
ventions" of the 1950's contain provisions allowing for a different type
of enforcement power: the "arrest or seize" clause. 124 For example,
article X, paragraph l(b) of the 1952 North Pacific Ocean Convention
(NPOC) provides that:
[I]f a person or a fishing vessel is "actually engaged in operations in
violation of the provisions of this Convention, or [if] there is rea-
sonable ground to believe [the person or vessel] was obviously so
engaged immediately prior to boarding of such vessel by any such
official, the latter may arrest.or seize such person or vessel.' 1 25
This type of provision allows "duly authorized officials of any
member state [to] board, search and seize vessels of other member
states which violate or are suspected of violating the convention or
binding conservation measures applicable to them. The vessels must
then be handed over to the member state having jurisdiction over
them .... ,,126 Since the Whaling Convention was the first document
of its kind, it is not certain why such a provision was not included.
Possibly the drafters feared that the fledgling Commission could not
120. See infra text accompanying note 125.
121. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 7, at 80, art. V, para. 3.
122. Koers, The Enforcement of International Fisheries Agreements, NETH. Y.B. INT'L L.
1, 12 (1973).
123. Carroz & Roche, The Proposed International Commission For The Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 673, 691 (1967). See also Koers, supra note 122, at 10.
124. Koers, supra note 122, at 10. Conventions with such provisions include: The North
Pacific Ocean Convention (1952); the Halibut Preservation Convention (1953); the North Pa-
cific Fur Seals Convention (1957); the Shrimp Convention (1958); and the Northwest Pacific
Ocean Convention (1959). Id. at 10 n.45.
125. International Convention (with annex and protocol) for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952, 205 U.N.T.S. 65, 92 (1952).
126. Carroz & Roche, supra note 123, at 691.
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withstand the exercise of such a power. 12 7 It is also possible that the
provision was simply never considered.
The power to arrest or seize a vessel would be useful in stopping
individual violations as they occur. For example, suppose the Whal-
ing Convention contained a provision such as the one in the NPOC. 28
A determination by the Commission that the Icelandic scientific re-
search permit was invalid could slow Icelandic whaling operations.
Each time the Icelandic whalers set up operations outside Iceland's
territorial waters which violated the moratorium, they could be seized
by officials of any other member state and returned to Iceland. While
Iceland would probably never prosecute its nationals for whaling vio-
lations, 29 the provision would have precluded the whalers in that in-
stance from further interference with the moratorium.
2. Removal of the Objections Clause
As discussed above, the objections clause allows a state to choose
not to be bound by any amendment to the Schedule by filing a timely
objection. 3 0 The objections procedure was originally included in the
Whaling Convention out of a fear that, otherwise, states would with-
draw from the Convention rather than bind themselves to unfavorable
amendments and that as a result the Commission's would collapse. 131
This has not been the case. Several times in the past, major whaling
states have withdrawn from the Convention, despite the objections
loophole; yet the Commission has survived. 32 Three of these states
later returned to the Commission. 33
Furthermore, many countries probably would not withdraw
from the Convention permanently in the absence of an objections
clause. Withdrawal is a much more drastic step than objection. Ob-
jection allows a state to retain the benefits of membership in the IWC
without bearing the burden of an unfavorable regulation. With-
drawal, on the other hand, removes the benefits as well as the bur-
127. Cf infra note 131 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. Iceland claims that there have been no violations to prosecute. Stewart, supra note 3,
at 18, col. 1.
130. See supra text accompanying note 35.
131. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 194.
132. Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Canada have at various times all withdrawn
from the Convention. Id. at 602.
133. As of the 1987 meeting of the IWC Japan, the Netherlands and Norway were all
voting members. Canada was not. 37 REP. INT'L WHAL. COMM'N 6 (1987).
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dens. 34 It seems unlikely that in the long run, these burdens would
so outweigh the benefits of membership that withdrawal would be-
come attractive to most states.
The other argument which has been made in support of the ob-
jections clause is that it is necessary for the protection of state sover-
eignty. 35 One suggested answer to this argument is that all rights to
whales as a property resource should be vested in a single agency.136
However, the Whaling Convention, under present international law,
does not and could not vest those rights in the IWC.137 Furthermore,
even if it were possible to give the IWC exclusive rights to the whales,
it might not be wise, from a purely conservationist standpoint, to do
so. Over the years, decreased profitability, rather than ecological con-
cerns, has been the major factor in at least some of the decline of
commercial whaling. 38 There is no guarantee that non-whaling
states would not resume whaling operations despite conservation con-
cerns if whaling were again to become sufficiently profitable. While
the Preamble to the Convention discusses conservation, it does so
only in relation to the preservation and development of the whaling
industry. 3 9 Additionally, the Convention does not prevent the short-
term interests of the industry from overriding its long-term interests
(for example, the preservation of whales).' ° The Preamble supports
conservation only so long as it does not cause "economic or nutri-
tional distress."
14
1
A second response to the sovereignty argument is that in the ab-
sence of an objections clause, a state which feels its sovereignty is seri-
ously threatened by an amendment would still retain its ability to
withdraw from the Convention. While this may seem a harsh alterna-
tive, it is equally harsh to allow the retention of a clause which effec-
tively cripples an entire international regulatory body.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Whaling Convention was drafted it was a pioneer doc-
134. For example, new technology and techniques are shared with other members but not
with non-members.
135. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 194.
136. Id. at 79.
137. Id. at 171.
138. See supra note 11.
139. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 3, at 74.
140. P. BIRNIE, supra note 2, at 172.
141. Int'l Whaling Regulation Convention, supra note 3, at 74.
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ument in its field. As such it has performed well. However, the past
forty years have pointed out the flaws in its design. Weaknesses writ-
ten into the Convention in order to protect the fledgling Commission
are no longer necessary. What is necessary now is a revised Whaling
Convention.
There is no single solution which will satisfy everyone. At one
extreme are the whaling states whose primary concern is economic.
These states are unlikely to support any revision which would force
them to adhere unconditionally to the regulations imposed by the
non-whaling majority. At the other extreme is the Sea Shepherd Soci-
ety whose primary goal is ecological. Sea Shepherd would likely not
be satisfied with anything short of a permanent ban on all whaling
and the creation of a body to enforce it. In the middle are the non-
whaling states and the more traditional environmental organizations.
To be adopted and successfully implemented, any solution will have
to fall somewhere in this middle ground.
Furthermore, any solution will have to address certain issues.
First, the IWC must have the power to bind all of its members to all
of its rules and regulations. In general, this can be accomplished by
removing the objections clause. In the immediate case of the morato-
rium, a second step is necessary. The schedule needs to be amended
to include the requirements for the issuance of scientific permits.
Such an amendment would give these requirements binding effect.
Finally, the Convention needs to be revised to include a stronger
form of enforcement power. An "arrest or seize" clause allowing en-
forcement by individual member states would strengthen the Com-
mission without requiring member states to completely abdicate
control to the IWC.
As the Convention is presently constructed, the IWC is essen-
tially an impotent anachronism. Revising the Convention by both re-
moving the objections clause and adding an "arrest or seize" clause
would give the International Whaling Commission a degree of credi-
bility which it presently lacks.
Elizabeth A. Wehrmeister
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Appendix A
Non-Aboriginal whale catches registered with the IWC. 1
Country2: Type: 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86
Brazil Minke 749 854 625 600 598
Chile Sperm 64 ni8 - ni -
Bryde's - ni 3 ni -
Iceland Fin 254 194 144 167 161
Sei 100 71 100 95 38
Minke 201 212 204 178 145
Sperm 43 87 - - -
Japan* Bryde's 485 482 536 481 317
Minke (SH)9 3577 3224 3027 1941 1941
Minke (NH)I0 374 324 290 410 320
Sperm 869 439 393 400 400
Norway* Minke 1877 1963 1869 804 771
Peru* Bryde's 250 320 149 ni -
Sperm 264 - -
S. Korea Bryde's I - - - -
Minke 760 898 485 378 122
Spain** Fin 146 150 120 102 48
USA** Minke 1 3 - - -
USSR Minke 3577 3223 3028 3027 3028
1. Aboriginal whale catches are not included in the moratorium so they will not be dealt with in
this Note. Year headings refer to both the coastal and pelagic (referred to in the reports as
"Antarctic") seasons. For example "81/82" refers to both the 1981/82 pelagic season and the 1982
coastal season.
2. "*" denotes countries which filed objections to the moratorium. 33 Rep. Int'l Whal. Comm'n at
40 (1983). "**" denotes countries which voted for the moratorium. 33 Rep. Int'l Whal. Comm'n at
- (1983).
3. 33 Rep Int'l Whal. Comm'n (1983).
4. 34 Rep Int'l Whal. Comm'n at 1 (1984).
5. 35 Rep Int'l Whal. Comm'n at 1 (1985).
6. 36 Rep Int'l Whal. Comm'n at 1 (1986).
7. 37 Rep Int'l Whal. Comm'n at 1 (1987).
8. No information available to the Commissison.
9. Southern Hemisphere.
10. Northern Hemisphere.
